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This article revolves around the fuzzy nature of land titles within and around the ‘Lal Dora’ 
(literally, ‘red thread’) ringing the urban villages of Delhi to understand how property 
ownership gets mediated through documents. Through a close look at three kinds of 
documents—land records, a particular notification over construction in the Lal Dora region 
and the General Power of Attorney, it pries open how these documents govern property 
relations today. As much as records and laws become the means through which the state 
attempts to intervene, disaggregate and make sense of property regimes, these attempts are 
frustrated through practices pertaining to property and localised bureaucratic effects. The 
evidence presented as documents, stamp papers or certificates is only superimposed on 
the larger field of property relationships in the urban villages of Delhi. The article shows 
that the informality produced by inconsistencies in these documents plugs into the logic of 
accumulation and comes through as a dynamic albeit inegalitarian force that challenges 
state power.
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I
Introduction
As social scientists, we no longer inhabit a world dominated by a rigid, 
positivistic rationality. The intellectual battles fought over what consti-
tutes objectivity, what one considers as ‘proof’, how fallible or infallible 
‘proofs’ themselves can be and whether documents speak more than the 
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written words, have made us rethink what evidence can possibly mean. The 
ways in which history and anthropology have evolved in a self-reflective 
fashion as disciplines have also paved the way for a more critical approach 
to what we see and hear. While archives, data, field notes and ethnography 
still remain important to us as evidence, our relationship with what we 
take as evidence, how we look at it and how we use it has become more 
complex and reflective.
Several scholars argue that plans remain restricted to the high mod-
ernist imagination of the planner and that plans have little to do with the 
realities of how people live (De Certeau 1984; Jacobs 1961; Scott 1998). 
Recent works on state planning have gone further to show us that plans, 
laws and regulations of the state are actually social products of human 
interaction, mediated and manipulated, as any other. Matthew Hull’s 
(2011) recent work shows how state documents like maps, circulars, 
forms, letters and reports are not simply impractical and inert documents 
of little consequence, but rather that their circulation among bureaucrats, 
property owners, property dealers, businessmen, builders and politicians 
has a significant impact upon the material realities along with creating 
new effects. While Nayanika Mathur (2016) shows how the act of writing 
bureaucratic letters is far from being a clinical act, Tarangini Sriraman 
(2018) illustrates how the state undercut its own rules in the absence of 
address proofs of the refugees in the wake of the Partition in Delhi to 
accept anything that looked like a paper with some authority to generate 
welfare identification documents. Documents, therefore, never really are 
objective ‘truths’. They get traded (Tarlo 2003), forged (Gupta 2012) and 
contested (Sriraman 2018).
Property, too, seems to operate at two levels. On the one hand, prop-
erty is seen as a stultified object, evidenced through documents that 
people either possess or do not. On the other, property can be understood 
as purely relational (Blomley 2004). If social space is imbued with power, 
land relations and property too are embedded in the same social relations 
of power. Property relations—how property is owned, exchanged and laid 
claims to—are matters of politics and are, therefore, always contested. 
But these two different meanings of property do not operate as separate 
planes. They come head to head with each other over documents. This 
article aims to discuss how these two unstable and tentative regimes—the 
property regime and the regime of documentation—interact with each 
other. It navigates through the territories of legality and illegality to 
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see how property ownership and state regulations map onto each other. 
How do we see the battle over property—whether it is legal or illegal 
and formal or informal—fought through the rubric of evidence? Also, 
in the process of doing so, how do we see evidentiary documents on 
land navigate through this topography of legality and illegality, given 
that they merely appear as objective? In a situation where close to all of 
Delhi’s urban properties may be seen as illegal in one way or the other 
(Ghertner 2011: 285), the relationship between property and law is a 
rich and diverse canvas.
The literature, which is concerned with state documents about land 
historically, has indicated that the state and its bureaucratic regime in 
the context of property ownership has constantly attempted to create a 
‘scientific and systematic’ form of accounting of land through numbers 
and calculations (Poovey 1998; Varley 2002). The primary function is 
to exude authority and objectivity.1 However, these documents couch 
within them diverse forms of violence, informal arrangements and 
inequalities. Land documents, like any other documents, compress and 
coagulate the social tension to be able to represent the ‘facts’ within the 
prescribed proforma. But, then, these documents are more than simply 
mutated representations—they hold power. These documents are simply 
another node in the complex web of property relations defined by caste, 
kinship and power. 
In order to understand the property relations in the urban villages of 
Delhi, I delineate interactions with three kinds of documents—land record 
documents, the 1963 notification on Lal Dora and the general power of 
attorney (GPA). Through a close look at these three, I explore the rela-
tionship among state, law and property relations. Documents themselves 
begin to tell a contradictory tale of property relations. They also do not 
necessarily remain the prerogative of the state. This article situates the 
questions of land, land value and politics of urban real estate and the overall 
question of political economy in relation to governmental documents to 
show how land grab is made possible through the gaps and crevices within 
these documents. As scholars of urbanisms, ‘property’ becomes an entry 
point to tap into the constellations of social interactions and contestations 
in order to theorise what these could possibly mean and imply.
1 Mary Poovey (1998) goes on to argue that the survey went a long way in terms of 
historically instituting numbers as facts in the public imagination around the 17th century.
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This question brings us to a discussion on informality. The ever 
burgeoning literature on informality has produced several interesting 
perspectives to understand informality especially from the perspective 
of the right to the city. Ananya Roy’s (2005) powerful argument as to 
how the state creates informality has been fundamental in this regard. 
She invokes Giorgio Agamben to argue that the ‘the planning and the 
legal apparatus of the state have the power to determine when to enact a 
“suspension” to determine what is informal and what is not, and to de-
termine which forms of informality will thrive and which will disappear’ 
(Roy 2005: 149; cf. Agamben 1998: 18). Much of the literature around 
urban informality that has followed has emphasised this nature of the state 
which produces informality either through planning (Bhan 2013; Sharan 
2014) or by providing legitimacy to some illegal structures and denying 
it to others (Ghertner 2015). 
The literature around public interest litigation (PIL) (Bhan 2016; 
Bhuwania 2017) and bourgeois environmentalism (Baviskar 2011) ges-
ture towards how the civil society/political society divide is reproduced 
where the poor and middle classes make their claims on the state differ-
ently. While the civil society acts through its formal access to the state 
by creation of new state spaces like the Bhagidari2 system and discourses 
on world-class aesthetics (Ghertner 2015; Srivastava 2009) or by filing 
PILs (Bhan 2016), the poor access it through negotiations with the lower 
bureaucracy, collective protests (Weinstein and Ren 2009) or by producing 
counter-archives (Bandopadhyay 2011). Existing literature shows how the 
state as an actor creates and maintains this distinction between the formal 
and the informal which then goes on to constitute the geographies of in-
equality in our cities today. But while this writing is important, it goes on 
to reproduce the same distinction that it began to critique. Informality of 
the rich gets legitimised by the state through law while the informality of 
the poor lies outside the domain of law and becomes a space of collective 
resistance (Anjaria 2011; Benjamin 2008) of conviviality (Gandhi 2011) 
and innovation (Birtchnell 2011). The lens of everyday life reveals the 
practice of corruption, for instance, as extractive but imbued with flex-
ibilities through which the marginalised find some space for negotiation 
(Anjaria 2011; Gupta 1995).
2 It is an initiative started in 2003 by the then incumbent Congress government to promote 
civic participation in local governance. 
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However, corruption also becomes that aberration from law, which be-
gins to complicate state–society interactions, whereby aberration becomes 
the norm. Law and state, despite being undone by the everyday state, at 
another plane appear untouched by workings at the ground level. Law 
and the state become the force which designates and orders people and 
objects around the axis of legality and illegality. By looking into property 
documents, I show how this designation of the formal and informal is far 
from neat, and that this is not necessarily for the lack of trying by the state. 
Despite numerous circulars and notifications, the space of urban villages 
in Delhi remains blurry. So, while this article stands on the shoulders of 
these works, the neat divisions that this literature has inadvertantly created 
need to be challenged.
I go back to one of the foundational essays on urban informality where 
Ananya Roy (2005) categorically warns us of this kind of dichotomy where 
the space of informality of the poor is understood as non-hierarchical 
and morally righteous. While it must be said that the intention of the 
aforementioned literature may not have been to romanticise the space 
of informality, the space of informality is now increasingly understood 
as a marginalised space. The problem I am pointing to is that the space 
of informality has not been looked at as a variegated, layered space. As 
informality and poverty have been conflated, these assumptions of the 
space of informality as being necessarily poor and egalitarian gets created 
as effects. While I am not making the case that this is necessarily false, 
but rather, that there are more ways of understanding informality. Going 
back to Roy’s warning, I try to show that this informality when posited 
against the state or the urban sense of aesthetics and gentrification is a 
highly variegated space and, therefore, cannot always be seen through the 
lens of the moral economy.
To contextualise this debate, I attempt to destabilise this imagery of 
the state as neatly designating and categorising property and practices as 
formal and informal. For doing this, I look at property and the regime 
of documents—property titles or legal orders—as the primary tools for 
producing and maintaining this divide. What if we began to understand 
this literature on formality and informality through the literature on the 
instability and unreliability of documents? Although informality always 
begins with the story of discrimination, I argue that a story of subaltern 
resistance and defiance does not seem to be the case always. In this article, 
I describe a tussle between the state and a powerful landowning caste over 
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the ‘legality’ of land. Through the cracks in state laws and land records, 
an informal space gets created for this landowning caste to maintain its 
dominance. For once, it is the state that tries to ordain a legal status to 
the land which the people are trying to resist. Informality in this context 
emerges as a source of power. Informality begins to be desired. Here, I 
look at urban villages of Delhi to understand how different meanings of 
property engage and interact with each other. 
II
Urban villages of Delhi
With rapid urbanisation in the 1950s and the 1960s, villages that were 
once outside the periphery of Delhi started getting acquired by the state 
for land development. In this case of land acquisition, it was only the 
agricultural land of the villagers that was acquired for the development 
of South Delhi, while their residential abadi land was not. Abadi areas or 
homesteads remained with villagers, and they continued to live there in 
their residential spaces. While a majorly agrarian-pastoralist rural society 
suddenly found itself in the middle of the city, it also had to learn to cope 
up with the loss of land. Over the next couple of decades, we saw these 
villagers themselves becoming speculators using the loopholes of the 
building bye-laws which supposedly exempted these villages from any 
building regulations. Since these villages predated any form of urban 
planning historically, their abadi areas were not subjected to building 
bye-laws in the beginning. As a result, most of these villages began to 
plug into the opportunities thrown up by the city—some emerged as lower 
middle-class housing spaces, while some emerged as godown spaces, 
some saw the mushrooming of cheap hotels and some became home to 
garment manufacturing workshops.
The villages I look at are a part of this milieu. Their lands were acquired 
during the 1950s to 1960s, and now lie right in the middle of rich, upper 
middle-class localities and malls of South Delhi. They are anomalies in 
all senses of the term—they are villages in the middle of the city and 
do not subscribe to either the politics or the ‘rule of aesthetics’ of upper 
middle-class Delhi (Ghertner 2015). As village land began to get mon-
etised, houses began to encroach into lanes. Cattle sheds and common 
spaces like squares and parks began to disappear to give rise to multi-
storey buildings with one-room sets to rent. By 2000, older houses were 
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broken down to erect cheaply built multi-storey buildings with a series 
of ‘one-room sets’—a room attached with a bathroom and a kitchen for 
letting out to the migrant youth. 
Village abadi land, which was understood to be communally owned 
property, did not have clear-cut rights of individual ownership, which 
allowed a rampant form of land grab by the dominant Jats of these vil-
lages. After acquisition, in villages where land consolidation did not take 
place, the village abadi was given one khasra (record register) number. 
Khasra numbers were given out on the basis of ownership and are, 
therefore, unchangeable. Designating the entire abadi area of the village 
as one khasra number means that there was no question of individual 
property titles within the village. As historically, village abadi was never 
revenue-generating land, the village abadi land had never been formally 
mapped. The revenue map shows other numbered khasras around the vil-
lage khasra. But most of those were agricultural properties, which were 
acquired by the state.
As the volume of migration grew, many of these villages too began 
to morph themselves overnight. A steady rent economy began to shape 
up in the face of the excessive demand for cheap and affordable hous-
ing in South Delhi. Land grabs became more and more lucrative as this 
was a market built on the logic of volume—the more one-room flats one 
could build, the more income one could also expect to earn. With this 
transformation of village land into real estate in the 1990s, most of the 
vacant village space was grabbed largely by Jats who could make the 
most of the opportunity. It is important to note here that the Jats who are 
the dominant caste in many of these urban villages, and have historically 
wielded social power, have been able to make the most of the opportunities 
thrown up by urbanisation. The Jats have historically had an extremely 
important relationship with land. Their sense of social identity is rooted 
in bhaichara—a form of collective ownership of land which was histori-
cally mediated through the panchayat system (Chakravarty-Kaul 1999; 
Kumar 2012). The social codes of the Jats since the time of these ‘village 
republics’ have been intrinsically related to land relations that exist within 
the community. The Jats who were once considered to be a dispersed tribe, 
with a strong clan network, acquired a new identity beyond that of a tribe 
or a clan once they came into the possession of land (Stokes 1980). Until 
the present, their regional solidarity is rooted in this identity of being Jats 
who run their own panchayats (Gupta 1997).
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Some of the land grab was done overnight, but some happened over 
a period of time, as if it was natural. The common, open spaces just 
outside the village periphery began to be claimed as private properties. 
The innocuous act of tying cattle and drying dung cakes acquired an ul-
terior motive. The act of drying dung cakes, which requires flat surfaces, 
also made it possible to surreptitiously encroach on more land slowly. 
Objects like dung cakes and firewood became primary instruments in 
not only asserting property rights but also in enabling expansion. In this 
scenario, social dominance often translated into more effective land 
grabbing through the use of violence. What John Locke shows to be a 
rather natural, peaceful process in the condition of a state of nature, such 
that people mix their labour with land to legitimately claim proprietor-
ship over that land, obfuscates the violence that often underlined this 
process later (Locke 1946). The manner of Lockean possession of land 
which glossed over the violence over Native Americans for instance in 
this case meant dispossession of dalit families from their land in some 
cases and an absolutely disproportionate grab of open, empty lands by 
the dominant Jats in others. 
While the land just outside Lal Dora (literally ‘red thread’), which had 
been acquired by the state was quickly getting grabbed by villagers and 
developed into smaller markets much earlier, village land which had little 
commercial value quickly began transforming into coveted land that could 
be developed into property for renting out since the 1990s. Land grab, 
both inside and outside Lal Dora, became a function of accumulation. 
Village lanes became narrower and village squares started disappearing 
as encroachment became extremely lucrative. The more lane area your 
house could encroach upon, the greater number of one-room sets that could 
be built. No wonder that in a short span, post-1990s, when these villages 
began to become increasingly popular with new migrants to the city, the 
villages too quickly morphed into a planner’s nightmare.
Lal Dora now remains a virtually unidentifiable line which no longer 
translates onto the field from the map. As rampant construction began tak-
ing place, the distinction beyond Lal Dora land and government-acquired 
land began to dissolve since villagers started building on land outside Lal 
Dora and on the lands acquired by the government which were still to be 
developed. Probably left intentionally blurred with buildings mushrooming 
everywhere, there is no longer a discernible line between the ‘village’ and 
the ‘unauthorised colony’ that fixes the status of a property.
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During my fieldwork, I found that the contours of Lal Dora always 
ended up being a ‘little ahead’ of someone’s property, therefore leaving 
one perplexed as to the limits and expanse of this rather mythical Lal Dora. 
The presence of Lal Dora and the supposed exemptions only led to ‘spill-
ing over’ and new urban development by land grabbing in areas outside 
Lal Dora. The status of most of these possessions is tenuous at best. The 
land encroached outside the Lal Dora can be identified as having been 
encroached in land records, but land grabs within the Lal Dora, in the 
absence of any property titles, remain unmapped.
The task at hand is to understand these land grabs and encroachments 
through land records, court cases, government circulars and other docu-
ments. In the 50–60 years that have passed since the land acquisition, the 
state which had once refused to address the question of land grabs around 
the Lal Dora is now slowly coming around to try and regulate them. But 
in the time span, when the state had been looking away, the affluent Jats 
of these villages exploited loopholes in the law to grab this land. The state 
is now attempting to regulate these spaces not simply because they need 
planning, but because the state is seeking to create its own stakes by as-
serting its presence through governmental measures. Creating clear land 
titles and bringing land into the objective, documented fold, therefore, 
is the only legitimate weapon that the state possesses while also being 
actively engaged in developing land illegally itself. The battle, therefore, 
takes place over the evidence and counter-evidence of property ownership, 
a qualitative valuation through various forms of documentary evidence 
and other alternative, informal ways of creating evidence in the absence 
of formal modes.
This brings us to ask: ‘How does informality navigate through state 
documents? How are these different kinds of possessions—legal and ille-
gal—made sense of by the state?’ The curious thing about property regimes 
within Lal Dora and unauthorised colonies is that property ‘ownership’ 
can mean a host of things. Two properties designated as ‘unauthorised’ 
might not have the same status. An unauthorised form of property can 
be unauthorised for various reasons such as squatting on land owned by 
someone else, using property in contravention of the land use designated 
or in violation of a building plan, possession through an act of sale which 
is not recognised (like GPA) or government land which has been acquired 
by the government but is still in possession of private people. The case 
of Lal Dora would show a range of claims made on the basis of a diverse 
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nature of possessions and ownerships where the two may not necessarily 
overlap. I look at three specific interfaces between informal property and 
documentary regimes—land record documents, the 1963 exemption and 
the GPA, for the same.
III
Land records
The Report of the Expert Committee on Lal Dora (ECLD) acknowledged 
these different kinds of unauthorised developments in Lal Dora/extended 
Lal Dora area—construction of floors beyond the permitted number, sale 
to commercial buyers, use of residential property for commercial use and 
commercial activity of non-village origin in the village (ECLD Report 
2007: 53). Here, layers of illegalities get produced within the lands of the 
Lal Dora, which leave one more ‘illegal’ than the other or one more ‘legible’ 
than the other. What kind of interventions does the state make in these 
places to work around citizens with such illegible properties especially 
when the illegibility of these properties is making accumulation through 
rent possible and all the more lucrative? These spaces have remained 
‘untamed’ despite various attempts by the state to wrest control over them. 
The logic of plans and maps interacts with the logic of practices of land 
ownership in urban villages in a manner that allows these spaces to foster 
and transform into prime real estate. The two kinds of property ownership, 
one that is documented and the other that is practised, are at conflict with 
each other. It is at the intersection of these two—where the documents 
appear fuzzy and the fuzzy properties seem perfectly functional on the 
ground—that we try to delve a little more into the question of informality.
The complicated nature of property ownership, and an even more 
complicated method of maintaining these land records, constantly tests 
the technocratic, objective ideal. As seen in Union of India and Another vs 
Gopal Seth and Others (2011), Letter Patents Appeal (LPA) 480–481/2005, 
the Delhi High Court notes a discrepancy between ‘acquisition’ and ‘pos-
session’ by the state.3 It was a common practice for the state to notify and 
3 LPA 480–481/2005—the case was that of 28 owners of plots in Sunlight Colony, 
which were sold between 1952–55 and were a part of Mohammadpur–Munirka which 
was acquired, who had gone to court and won the case against acquisition. The defendants 
had filed several letters demanding alternate plots in Masjid Moth in lieu of their land in 
Sunlight Colony. The judgment, however, notes that they were still in possession of the 
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acquire land and pay compensation for it but then leave it unused. These 
stretches of land, some vacant and some already built up before land ac-
quisition itself, became the site for the growth of unauthorised colonies in 
Delhi. The plethora of ways in which property comes to be possessed or 
owned in these villages needs to be taken cognisance of within the land 
revenue records so that they do not remain bearers of facts of proprietor-
ship but real actors in these transactions.
Records and documents have never been innocent—and the ones 
pertaining to property, even less so. They embody within them myriad 
hierarchies, power equations and errors and crimes of omission and com-
mission. Owing to their origin to the land records systems in medieval 
times, these records have evolved through the colonial and the postcolo-
nial eras. The document Khasra Girdawari was used to enlist the names 
of the owner, the cultivator, or information, such as whether the land is 
self-cultivated, extent of the area and what crops have been sown, which 
needed to be updated every four years. Since the status of the land has 
not been agricultural for a long time, most of these columns containing 
information on types of crops, etc. are now redundant. 
The Khasra Girdawari register, which is still supposed to be updated 
every four years, has in fact become an indicator of how changes in the 
nature of land relations have taken place. As the village abadi is within 
one khasra number, the manoeuvrings around land within the abadi area 
remain opaque. But it is revealing in the context of the agricultural area 
outside the village abadi that has been acquired by the state. While the 
register bears the name of the ‘owner’ of a particular piece of land and 
its particular khasra number, it also indicates the ‘occupier’ of the same 
land which is often not one and the same. The columns which once used 
to enter the names of owner and the tenant farmer on agricultural land 
land in dispute. The defendants had never been dispossessed of this land by the C.P.W.D. 
(Central Public Works Department).
The Delhi High Court notes:
The only evidence produced on behalf of the defendants, is that possession of this land 
was taken and transferred to the C.P.W.D. by the Land Acquisition Collector on 8.6.57. 
No evidence has been produced to prove that the C.P.W.D. was still in possession of 
this land at the time of the filing of these suits. It seems legitimate to presume that 
the defendants so-called possession of this land did not go beyond the proceedings of 
possession held on 8.6.57 and that the C.P.W.D. and other concerned Officers took no 
subsequent steps to assert their possession. (para no. 16).
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are now used to keep an account of the ‘owner’ and the ‘occupier’. The 
two figures that emerge, one the ‘owner’ and the other the ‘occupier’, are 
often located at two ends of the spectrum of legality. In this case, wher-
ever the owner and the occupier are different entities, it seems that the 
owner of the land is mostly sarkar daulatdar (the government) while the 
occupiers are mostly private individuals. This goes to show the rampant 
encroachment of government land that has taken place. The encroacher’s 
entry into the register itself marks a certain degree of legitimacy of that 
possession today. The document, though, has recorded encroachment or 
land grab, the very fact of recording itself strengthens the claims of the 
occupier of the land.
During my fieldwork, I found that the Tehsildar4 and other officials at 
the revenue office have very little acquaintance with Urdu, the erstwhile 
administrative language of land records. The Patwari,5 Raghubir Sanwal,6 
has no reading or writing abilities in Urdu, while Sushil Verma, his assis-
tant, who has been working in this office for years, has equipped himself 
to understand basic terms and digits which help him get by with the docu-
ments. With several years of practice, Verma is the only one in the office 
who could try to make sense of these complicated documents to some 
extent due to this working knowledge. And yet, the authority to interpret 
these documents lies with officials in the revenue office. However, their 
limited expertise makes way for new interpretations of what is written 
in these documents. This shows that knowledge can also be created by 
revenue personnel by virtue of the authority to interpret these documents 
rather than knowledge bestowing authority that is technocratic and related 
to expertise. The practice of land record documentation works entirely on 
the logic of ‘translatability’. It is not only a question of translation—from 
4 A Tehsildar is a class I gazetted officer who heads the District Revenue Office.
5 Patwari is a lower-level official in the revenue office who is in charge of most of these 
land records. Oscar Lewis describes the Patwari system thus: ‘The [patwari] system seems 
to have been established at the time of Akbar in the [16th] century. In former times [patwaris] 
were servants of the village and were paid for by the zamindars (Lewis 1958: 330).’ He 
quotes Baden-Powell (1892) on Patwari system: ‘The Patwari is, in effect, the accountant 
of the village, both as regards the revenue-payments due from the various co-sharers, the 
distribution of the profits of the joint-estate, and the accounts of rent payment between 
landlord and tenant; he is also the registrar of changes in ownership due to succession and 
transfer’ (Powell 1892, 2: 278, cited in Lewis 1958: 330). See Baden-Powell, Baden Henry. 
1892. Land-Systems of British India, Vol. 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
6 The names used here have been changed to protect identity.
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Urdu to Hindi, from an administrative parlance to a colloquial one and 
from a knowledge that rests in the various textual registers to an actual 
physical geographical space. It carries with it the dilemma, the limitations 
and entrapments of translation—that not only could it never be translated 
exactly but that it is also very much amenable to being intentionally 
mistranslated.
With Urdu phased out of administrative use and Persian and Arabic going 
out of our social milieu, what is created is another level of complication in 
terms of accessing the data that exists in the form of land records. The land 
record office emerges then not simply as a repository of these documents but 
as a centre of authority pertaining to these documents manned by officials 
who are assumed to be able to read and interpret them along with the power 
to disseminate their meaning. This interpretation as we have discussed is 
never straightforward. The distance between the knowledge as it exists in 
these documents and its dissemination as information to people is mediated 
by power relations, practices of corruption and bureaucratic procedures. 
Lewis had noted the extent of authority that the patwari yields simply by 
virtue of having knowledge over land documents (1958: 332–36). Here, 
we see how the revenue office manages to maintain that control despite 
limited knowledge. The official positions of revenue personnel give them 
a semblance of knowledge which goes on to function as knowledge. This 
control over information gives the lower-level officials much power and 
discretion, which is then utilised to take part in speculation and land deals. 
While the state strives for legibility through circulars, laws and notifica-
tions, the everyday practices of the state work to make it illegible to itself 
(Das and Poole 2004; Fuller and Benei 2000). The patwari and other of-
ficials at the revenue office are a quintessential demonstration of how the 
state and society are not strictly watertight compartments (Gupta 1995; 
Mitchell 1991). The life of bureaucratic objects and the material practices 
of the bureaucracy and its regime of documents and papers here reside in 
the logic of the political economy, state power and speculation in land. 
In the case of a dubious status of land that may fall within or outside 
the Lal Dora, the lower officials, in collusion with the Jat landlords, are 
able to either manoeuvre around the laws or generate newer documents 
like the GPA. The land in question, thereby, can be kept in its illegible 
status—illegible for the state while maintaining and continuing its regime 
of accumulation for the Jats. The tussle between legality and illegality is, 
therefore, that of accumulation.
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IV
The diverse meanings of the 1963 notification
The emergence of the real estate boom in the urban villages of Delhi was 
made possible by the ‘absence’ of building laws and relentless construc-
tion that just cannot take place anywhere in the rest of the city. But, this 
‘absence’ is highly contested, and the documents hardly lend themselves 
to a singular reading. At the heart of the struggle between the state and 
the local landlords is the contention over the 1963 notification which 
supposedly had made the urban villages exempt from building bye-laws. 
One reading of the laws and office circulars claim that exemptions came 
with a 1963 notification of Delhi Development Authority (DDA) which 
allowed the rural abadi areas within both the Lal Dora and the extended 
Lal Dora to disregard certain sections under the building regulations of 
the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The notification had stated 
that within Lal Dora or the extended Lal Dora, no building permission 
was required for constructing a house by the owner on a particular plot 
for his or her own residential requirement.
The other reading is that the 1963 exemptions were only meant for 
rural villages and not the urbanised ones. The ECLD formed to look 
into the matter of urbanised villages alleges that the planning documents 
never made the distinctions clear between rural and urban villages. This, 
in turn, led to the misinterpretation that the exemptions were applicable 
to urbanised villages as well.7 Only in 2009 did an office order clearly 
iterate that the ‘implied meaning’ of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi 
(MCD) notification dated 24 August 1963 was that no Lal Dora exists 
after a village is notified as urbanised and, therefore, no exemptions re-
ally apply. In one stroke, the state declared all properties in urban villages 
illegal, as they were all violating the building bye-laws in one way or the 
other. The office order substantiates that the exemption available to the 
residential buildings within Lal Dora of a rural village does not apply to 
any property in an urbanised village. This only meant that for all practical 
purposes, owing to a ‘misreading’ of the law, these villages had grown in 
ways that they had chosen.
7 DDA, ECLD Report (p. 14). The committee report while sympathetic towards the 
cause of the villagers also mentions that the exemptions for rural villages are also limited to 
obtaining sanctions of building plans for their residential units. See DDA, ECLD Report (p. 16).
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Though we will deal with the series of circulars trying to roll back the 
supposed exemptions, it is important to note here how vague regulations 
and flexibility are the norm in the state’s planning and how vagueness in 
law only produces new kinds of spaces, subjectivities, power and social 
relations (Gururani 2013; Roy 2009). The misconceptions over the Lal 
Dora exemptions have now created a peculiar property regime, and the 
non-existent Lal Dora has become an intrinsic part of real geographies 
(Baeten 2004).
By turning a blind eye to these developments, the state now attempts 
to wrest control over these spaces and constantly tries to bring in new 
regulations. It attempts to generate a newer kind of ‘formalised’ docu-
mentation through circulars and directives which provide for an alterna-
tive form of evidence. As early as 1985, the Mini–Master Plan began by 
suggesting that the earlier privileges which were accorded to villages as 
exemptions to building bye-laws must end and that building plans have 
to be sanctioned by either the DDA or MCD (DDA 1985: 5). The court 
too directed the MCD to consider withdrawing its exemptions from the 
villages in the year 2005.8 
However, as discussed earlier, there exists another interpretation of the 
same 1963 exemption in the bureaucratic view that the exemption was 
never meant for urban villages but rather exclusively for rural villages. 
Since the first authoritative clarification of the 1963 exemption came 
only in 2009, there have been significant attempts by the state to bring 
these village areas under some form of legibility. The building activities 
in urban villages are now governed by the notification issued by DDA 
on 17 January 2011 known as the ‘Building Regulations for Special 
Area, Unauthorised Regularised Colonies and Village Abadis, 2010’ and 
Circular No.TP/G/3426/11 dated 28 September 2011 in conjunction with 
the Delhi Master Plan 2021 (MCD 2011). It states that it would be the 
8 M.C Mehta v. Union of India and Others, (2004) 6 SCC 588 was on the issue of 
unauthorised construction for industrial activity in residential areas in Delhi. The Supreme 
Court notes:
In respect of the industrial activity in Lal Dora, in the affidavit filed in October, 2002 by 
Chief Town Planner of Municipal Corporation of Delhi it has been stated that the proposal 
for the withdrawal of exemption notification would be placed before the Corporation. 
Nothing seems to have been done in that direction. It is not disputed that under the garb 
of exemption notification dated 24thth August, 1963, all kinds of buildings have come 
up in the Lal Dora (para no. 69).
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responsibility of the residents/Residents Welfare Association (RWA) to 
prepare a layout plan and get it approved from the local body. It clearly 
mentions that all existing exemptions with respect to sanctioning of 
building plans in the village abadis will cease to exist from the date of 
notification of these regulations.
In a circular issued by MCD on 28 September 2011, following the 2011 
DDA notification, it was notified that all properties within the Lal Dora 
would need an affidavit as substantive proof of ownership, certification by 
the revenue department that the plot forms part of the old built-up abadi area, 
certification of correctness with regard to size and shape of the area along 
with its location within Lal Dora as certified by the revenue authorities.9 The 
circular also clearly mentions several directives for construction as well.
The aforementioned attempts by the state to make these villages more 
legible are attempts by the state to become a stakeholder in a property 
regime. The informality, the vagueness in terms of interpretation of laws 
and rules that the state deliberately maintains in this case with regard to 
urban villages does not seem to work in favour of the state any longer. The 
state is now moving towards regulating these spaces. Such regulation will 
help the state to map these localities and make them governable but also 
enable it to draw taxes from these properties more legibly, something it 
has not been able to do so far. The battle, therefore, is fought over papers.
The Jat landlords, however, find the space of informality enabling as a 
space for accumulation. The space of informality allows them to use their 
collective strength to maintain chains of accumulation through rent (Pati 
2016). What we see here is quite the obverse of what most other literature 
on informality displays. The teeming literature on informality which has 
become subsumed under subaltern heroism underrepresents how informal-
ity is also an unequal and violent space. The local landlords here are able 
to maintain their collective dominance through caste and landedness which 
exploit practices of informality. Quite unlike slum dwellers and inhabitors 
of unauthorised colonies, who look to formalising their property, the Jat 
landlords of these villages are struggling to keep this realm of informality 
intact. The tussle between the state as the super landlord and the landlords 
is that of who gets to accumulate, and this tussle is mediated through 
various governmental directives and notifications, court cases and the gaps 
9 D-111/COM/SDMC/2012, Circular issued by the office of the Commissioner, South 
Delhi Municipal Corporation, dated 20 June 2012.
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and contestations they create. While the local landlords want it to remain 
in the realm of informality, which provides them with greater scope to 
manoeuvre around, the state wants to rationalise these spaces in order to 
tax them better. The tussle between legality and illegality is, therefore, 
that of accumulation—a form of accumulation that can take place through 
evidence and counter-evidence of property over fictions and realities of 
documents and ownership. In a situation where accumulation through land 
grabs is possible for the landlords through the crevices in documentary 
regimes, the state responds by attempting to rein them in through what it 
does best—generate more documents.
These villages are as susceptible to demolitions as any other unau-
thorised colony or any other slum in Delhi. In fact, if one looks closely, 
demolition, or rather the threat of it, is probably the only potent way in 
which the state makes, or rather can make, its presence felt. The spectre 
of the state and its sovereign power looms large in the form of the threat 
of demolition. But the collective strength that the Jats have been able to 
maintain and penetrate institutions like the municipal corporation and the 
police undercuts the threat of demolition by the sovereign power through 
the machinations at the local level.
The sheer resistance of these urban villages to be mapped, organised 
and ordered by the state despite numerous efforts shows how the state has 
failed to formally regulate the accumulation process and how the local 
landlords have been able to generate newer practices of accumulation 
which make use of this illegibility. This fuzziness, this untranslatability, 
drew from the fact that this formerly communal land neither remained 
communal nor could it be transformed to the liberal regime of private, 
exclusive ownership. Further, the form and nature of informality, though 
having emanated from state’s planning, later began to work against the 
interests of the state, while the powerful Jat landlords here were able to 
manipulate it in their favour.
V
Possession versus ownership through GPA
The complications over understanding land relations are not simply limited 
to that of the records over Lal Dora status. Apart from the Khasra Girdawari 
register, which speaks through its two columns of ‘owner’ and ‘possesser’, 
land transactions are further complicated by the presence of the GPA. 
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The use of instruments and innovations like that of the GPA whereby 
it becomes possible for people to have the right to transfer disputed or 
unauthorised property has become one of the most popular instruments 
of transactions of land in this scenario. The GPA first came into place to 
circumvent transfer and sale restrictions placed on leasehold property 
which had significant restrictions placed upon the legal transfer of such 
property.10 GPA is a modified legal document which is not recognised as a 
legal sales transfer and does not give the buyer legal title to property.11 The 
sale of property through GPA was banned in 2012 following a Supreme 
Court order in 2011.12 However, since the GPA remains a rather popular 
instrument of transferring land in a city whose cityscape is dominated by 
unauthorised construction, the Delhi government quite predictably had to 
come around and in July 2013 lifted the ban on registration of property 
transfers done under GPA.
The GPA is often accompanied by an Agreement to Sell document, 
which is not the actual sale but a contractual agreement to sell a property 
on particular terms and for a particular price.13 However, soon enough, 
GPAs began to be used for property transfers. Transfers made through 
GPAs did not invite registration charges and stamp duties associated with 
legal transfers which resulted in major losses for the revenue department.14 
GPAs then evolved to circumvent all kinds of restrictions on the sale of 
10 For more, see Nambiar (1994).
11 Supreme Court of India notes in Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs State of Haryana 
& Anr. on 11 October 2011, SLP (C) 13917/2009: https://www.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/38729.
pdf. Accessed on 18 February 2019) that
 [GPA] is not an instrument of transfer in regard to any right, title or interest in an 
immovable property. The [GPA] is creation of an agency whereby the grantor authorises 
the grantee to do the acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor, which when executed 
will be binding on the grantor as if done by him. ....It is revocable or terminable at any 
time unless it is made irrevocable in a manner known to law (para no. 2).
12 See SLP (C) 13917/2009.
13 Supreme Court of India notes in ibid.:
Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is not a registered deed of conveyance 
(deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements of Sections 54 and 55 of Transfer 
of Property Act and will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable 
property (except to the limited right granted under Section 53A of Transfer of Property 
Act) (para no. 12).
14 Keeping in mind these losses that the state was incurring, in 1989, the government 
decided to regularise property transferred through GPA with a proof of possession, in return 
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property. GPAs, therefore, acquired an unprecedented popularity in Lal 
Dora villages and have been rampantly used to possess property without 
necessarily having the requisite documents or even paying taxes.
Property transfer through the GPA is one reason which complicates the 
nature of ‘possession’ and goes on to create ‘complex layers of claims’ 
which make a clear resolution of land titling almost impossible (Benjamin 
and Raman 2011: 42). Despite the fact that they are unregistered, their 
extensive presence has created a legal–administrative sphere that has to 
negotiate with them in this battle over legality and infrastructure (ibid.). 
In the absence of formal land records and documents, the GPA has worked 
as a form of an innovated document by the people, which had to be given 
a semblance of recognition owing to its rampant use. Not only is the legal 
registration of land a costly affair to some extent, the property owners 
of urban villages prefer to avoid it as it makes the piece of land and its 
usage very rigid and rule-bound. In the case of unauthorised property, it 
becomes all the more important to circumvent the legal process. So, in 
that case, the GPA is a manufactured piece of documentary evidence used 
to circumvent the documentary regimes of property ownership in order to 
create the right to alienate property. The GPA allows for transactions and 
land speculation to take place informally while also manufacturing a sense 
of legality through the GPA. It creates multiple, complex layers of claims 
on land unlike a singular property right. In several cases of land-related 
disputes, multiple stakeholders over a piece of land have claimed owner-
ship of the one piece of land owing to the presence of numerous GPAs.
GPAs exhibit how the property right gets exercised in ways that are 
almost in opposition to the standard assumption of property right as black 
and white. A document like the GPA allows for the existence of law be-
yond the ambit of formal law itself, whereby the legality is imagined and 
manufactured with little or no institutional legitimation. The presence 
of the GPA elicits a sense of affective trust in the lives of people who 
associate GPAs with a sense of legality and security of property.15 While 
the land record documents authorised land, the GPA as a purely invented 
document authorises the sale and purchase of such land. These documents 
together create authenticity, however fragile and challengeable, by precisely 
for payment of conversion charge, registration charges and stamp duties (see Nambiar 
1994: 46).
15 I am drawing from the work of Ghosh (2017). Her larger work traces the history and 
affects that stamp papers go on to create, often outside the purview of law as we understand it. 
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the fact that they have been documented on a piece of paper that looks 
authoritative. GPAs disrupt the logic of the modern state, which reposes 
all authority of issuing documents to itself. As documents occupying 
a liminal space in law, they have been able to undercut the documents 
ordained by the state to a considerable extent.
The Jat community’s phenomenal rise to power in the city of Delhi 
could only happen as land acquired speculative value and, by extension, 
how land could be transformed into real estate. However, we also see 
how the state and the cartel of landowners (Pati 2016) compete with 
each other to accumulate—while the state does it through bye-laws, 
circulars and such, the cartel of landlords do it through encroachment 
and maintaining its unity against demolitions in collaboration with the 
everyday state. If maps are understood as cartographic projections of 
property relations that define and regulate property (Blomley 2004), to 
be unmapped allows for a host of possibilities. Therefore, it is apparent 
why this community uses its influence in order to keep the village land 
entirely outside the state’s scope of knowledge. Unlike James Scott’s 
(2010) influential work on hill societies in South and South East Asia 
where people move across this disparate region in order to avoid the 
state, this case is able to show how this zone of being ‘not governed’ is 
neither egalitarian nor evasive of the state. In fact, the local landlords 
enter electoral politics and work around legalities in order to not be 
governed and yet tame the Leviathan.
This takes us back to the question of law, documents and the very 
nature of evidence itself. Carlo Ginzburg (1991: 85) reminds us that our 
shift from a positivistic understanding of the relation between evidence 
and truth should not mark an altogether rejection of evidence itself, but 
rather a more layered, tentative relationship that we have with evidence, 
not as a transparent medium but as a historic document itself. The land 
record documents, and the GPA show exactly how evidences, sometimes 
contradictory, are created and maintained in order to create evidence for 
‘something else’. This ‘something else’ constitutes the fictions of land, 
possession and ownership which share a tenuous relationship with reality. 
As the ‘formal’ and the ‘legal’ begin to appear unstable, we are then able 
to see how informality gets constructed in one moment and then comes 
undone in the next. At least in the realm of property relations, the distinction 
between formality and informality is far more blurred. The state too finds 
itself in a space that it cannot violently clamp down on nor easily legitimise. 
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From this lens, the state, armoured with all its legal paraphernalia, appears 
as far less powerful, almost like the metaphorical spider who gets caught 
in its own web. At the same time, the spaces of informality operating 
within the crevices of law and exploiting every possibility for further 
accumulation seem far less innocent.
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